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Abstract 
 
 
The rise of Khomeini and the events of 9/11 motivated two waves of intellectual 
thought devoted to explaining the emergence of the more radical and militant 
strains of political Islam. This paper takes an innovative approach to this 
intellectual tradition by utilizing charismatic leadership theory to understand the 
emergence and role of charismatic leaders in the evolutionary development of 
the modern Islamist movement. The study of charismatic leadership, rather than 
focusing exclusively upon the individual leader, is primarily concerned with 
understanding the merger of social, cultural, historical, psychological and 
ideological dynamics which create a context conducive for the emergence of the 
charismatic leader-follower relationship. Consequently, this paper will offer 
critical insights into the phenomenon of Islamic radicalism and militancy itself. 
This paper identifies a chain of charismatic leaders stretching across the entire 
chronology of the modern Islamist movement, from Jamal al-Afghani of the 
1800s to Osama bin Laden and Abu Musab al-Zarqawi of today, reflecting an 
increasing radicalisation and propensity towards violence with the rise of each 
leader. How has this phenomenon come to exist? This paper argues that it is 
due to the transformative charisma phenomenon in Islamic radicalism and 
militancy. This is the notion that this chain of charismatic leaders emerges due 
not only to an ever present and intensifying perception of crisis within 
communities of potential support, but also to the ability of such leaders to build 
on the charismatic capital of preceding leaders. 
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Introduction 
 
 
The success of the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979 and the events of 9/11 instigated 
two distinct waves of intellectual thought devoted to explaining the emergence of the 
more radical and militant strains of political Islam. This paper seeks to continue this 
intellectual tradition by utilizing charismatic leadership theory to understand the role of 
the charismatic leader in the evolutionary development of the modern Islamist 
movement. The study of charismatic leadership focuses primarily upon understanding 
the merger of social, cultural, historical, psychological and ideological dynamics which 
create a context conducive for the emergence of the charismatic leader-follower 
relationship. In this paper I argue that the charismatic leader has acted as the vehicle 
for the evolution of the modern Islamist movements most radical and militant strains. 
The identification of a chain of charismatic leaders stretching across the entire 
chronology of the modern Islamist movement, from Jamal al-Afghani of the 1800s to 
Osama bin Laden and Abu Musab al-Zarqawi of today, reflects an increasing 
radicalization of ideology and propensity towards violence with the rise of each leader. 
This paper argues that this phenomenon emerges due to the transformative charisma 
phenomenon (TCP) in Islamic radicalism and militancy which is the notion that an 
identifiable chain of charismatic leaders emerges due to both an ever present and 
intensifying perception of crisis within communities of potential support and the ability 
of such leaders to build on the charismatic capital of their predecessors. 
 
Prior to delving into the TCP in Islamic radicalism and militancy it is necessary to 
address theories of charismatic leadership. Space considerations restrict my analysis 
to highlighting the key features of Max Weber's theory of charismatic leadership, 
arguably the pioneering work of the field, before giving a brief analysis of the 
proceeding developments. I will then present a generic theoretical framework of 
charismatic leadership theory that will help to inform the remainder of this paper. 
 
Charismatic leaders emerge from almost all socio-cultural contexts and it is important 
to establish the socio-cultural context for this specific investigation. While recognising 
that Islam is an extremely diverse entity of sectarian, ethnic, nationalistic, cultural and 
doctrinal differences, I will present a model for understanding diversity within Islam. 
The “Model of diversity in Islamic orientation” will illustrate not only the diversity within 
Islam, but the transitional and rationalised nature of the radicalisation process between 
“secularist”, “modernist”, “radical” and “militant” orientations. I will argue that the 
charismatic leader plays an important role in the process of individual and collective 
radicalization and therefore propensity to violence.  
 
Finally, I will discuss the TCP in Islamic radicalism and militancy with the aim of tracing 
and analysing the chain of charismatic leaders which led to the emergence of the 
Islamic terrorism phenomenon. The characteristics of the TCP will be discussed and 
analysed focusing exclusively on the evolutionary development of the most radical and 
militant strains of political Islam. Two important findings will emerge here. Firstly, the 
evolutionary developments of the phenomenon reflect shifting perceptions of crisis 
which correspond with the socio-historical developments of any given period. Secondly, 
as the perception of crisis intensifies there is a parallel increase in both the 
radicalization of ideology and propensity towards violence.  
 
 
Charismatic Leadership Theory: A brief introduction1 
 
 
The “charismatic leadership phenomenon” can arguably be traced back to the early 
stages of human social development. “Charisma has its roots long ago in human 
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evolution. From the advent of symbolically-orientated behavior, charisma has existed 
as a latent potential in all social systems….” (Bradley, 1987: 3). Comparatively, the 
theoretical study of charismatic leadership is a more recent development, its origins 
being found most significantly in Max Weber’s Economy and Society (1968). Weber’s 
work has greatly influenced the study of charismatic leadership, and while an in-depth 
analysis of his work is not possible here2, it is important to consider Weber's core 
findings as it is difficult to find a theory of charismatic leadership which has not been 
influenced by his work (See Arthur Schweitzer (1984), Julien Freund (1968), E.A. Shils 
(1965) and Alan Bryman (1992)).  
 
In Economy and Society, Weber discusses charismatic leadership within the context of 
his, “…three pure types of legitimate domination” (1968: 215), where domination is 
defined as, “…the probability that certain specific commands (or all commands) will be 
obeyed by a given group of persons” (1968: 212). Recognising that people will not 
simply submit to domination, Weber argued that legitimation of such domination is 
achieved via the transformation of discipline into an adherence to a “truth” held by the 
leadership of a social group. Moving on, Weber identified legitimate domination as 
resting on rational, traditional or charismatic grounds. For Weber, charismatic grounds 
rested on, “…devotion to the exceptional sanctity, heroism or exemplary character of 
an individual person, and of the normative patterns or order revealed or ordained by 
him” (1968: 212).  
 
It is within the context of his three forms of legitimate domination that Weber presents 
his theory of charismatic leadership and four critical principles can be drawn from his 
theory:  
 
i. The charismatic person attracts followers to himself/herself as a leader due to 
personal attributes which he or she may contain. 
ii. The followers recognise that the charismatic personality has attributes which they 
perceive as being genuine and therefore follow the charismatic leader with a 
sense of awe, hope and faith. Weber recognised charismatic leadership as a 
relationship and charisma as the bonds which helped form that relationship. 
iii. The environment, beyond the individual psychology of the followers, must also be 
favorable, usually a society under great stress, for the acceptance of the 
charismatic personality as leader. 
iv. Due to the ephemeral nature of charismatic authority there is a tendency for 
charismatic authority to give way to either rational or traditional authority after a 
period of time. There is also a problem if the charismatic leader dies and the 
followers and movement are forced to find a new leader. Weber articulates 
alternatives for both of these possibilities (routinisation). (See Weber 1968) 
 
While the influence of Weber's theory is unquestionable, the field of charismatic 
leadership theory has moved on from Weber’s original conception of the phenomenon.  
Unfortunately, Weber’s theory of charismatic leadership is superficial in many respects 
and he does not elaborate upon many of the concepts which he introduces. For 
example Weber did not elaborate upon the nature of charisma and the charismatic 
relationship, the psychological dynamics of the followers or the nature of the 
“necessary crisis”. However, for Weber and the great majority of proceeding theorists, 
charisma is understood not as a personality trait, but rather the bond between a leader 
and followers that must be accepted for charismatic appeal to be generated and a 
charismatic relationship to form (See Bradley & Roberts 1988; Conger 1988; Bryman 
1992; Willner 1968; Eisenstadt 1995a). It is the nature of the charismatic relationship 
which is arguably the most controversial debate in the field3 and it is this debate which 
forms the fault-lines which differentiate the sociological-symbolic approach4 from the 
self-concept based5, or the psychoanalytical6 from the social formation approaches7. 
Due to space considerations, it is not possible to delve into these approaches. 
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A generic theoretical framework of charismatic leadership 
 
 
I now seek to offer my own theoretical approach to the charismatic leadership 
phenomenon that builds upon preceding theories of charismatic leadership while 
containing a number of original contributions to the field. There are two purposes 
behind developing a generic theoretical framework, the first being to establish a 
theoretical basis for the remainder of this discussion. Secondly, a universalist 
framework implies that the emergence of a charismatic leader is not due to inherent 
flaws in the socio-cultural environment or the irrationality of the individuals involved, 
but rather due to universal social dynamics. The five-point framework is as follows:   
 
1. The charismatic leader attracts followers due to personal attributes which are 
recognised by followers as exceptional and as a consequence he/she is 
followed with a sense of awe, hope and faith. Furthermore, charismatic 
leadership is a reciprocal, interdependent, empowering and rationalised 
relationship which develops between a leader and his/her followers. 
 
2. While notions of heroism or great knowledge are attributes commonly ascribed 
to a charismatic leader, it is important to recognise that culture plays a crucial 
role in what attributes are considered exceptional in any given society. 
Consequently, cultural and socio-historical traditions and myths play a crucial 
role in the emergence of a charismatic leader. Indeed, charismatic leaders will 
both manipulate and emulate culturally specific myths, traditions and figures to 
empower both themselves and their followers by offering them a source of 
personal and collective identity, as well as to construct their image.  
 
3.  Charismatic leaders will use not only rhetoric or the presentation of a doctrine, 
but the manipulation of modern communication technology, as tools and 
techniques to generate their images, charismatic appeal and support. Ideology 
plays a central role in the generation of charismatic appeal for a leader and 
modern communication tools are frequently manipulated not only to spread 
their message but generate charismatic appeal. 
 
4. The environment surrounding the emergence of a charismatic leader is 
characterised by the perception of crisis within both the individual and collective. 
While it may be possible to quantitatively identify the source of the perceived 
crisis (e.g. an increase in unemployment), this may not always be the case. In 
fact, a charismatic leader will often build upon, manipulate or even create the 
perception of crisis within the individual and collective. For example, a 
charismatic leader may create a sense of moral panic8 ("perception of crisis") 
within both the individual and collective. The perception of crisis within a 
community feeds the notion within both individuals and the collective that 
established authorities have failed to recognise, deal with or alleviate the crisis 
situation. Hence, an increased susceptibility to the emergence of a charismatic 
leader.  
 
5. The routinisation of charisma is inevitable due to the ephemeral nature of the 
phenomenon. While there is a tendency for charismatic leadership to be 
replaced by legal-rational or traditional forms of leadership if the movement is 
successful, the death of a charismatic leader poses a problem for the 
remaining members. Commonly, such a situation results in either the break-up 
of the movement, the replacement of the leader by either traditional means, the 
designation of a new leader by the remaining followers or the charismatic 
leader before his/her death, or a search for a replacement through the 
identification of certain attributes. Nevertheless, it is important to recognise that 
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the process of routinisation does not necessarily signify the death of charisma. 
In fact, charisma may indeed emerge due to routinisation9.  
 
 
Islam, its revolutionary qualities and the charismatic leader: Diversity in Islamic 
orientations 
 
 
As outlined in the preceding framework, culture and socio-historical traditions play a 
fundamental role in the popularity and following of a charismatic leader. Space 
considerations will not allow an in-depth analysis of the Islamic tradition and its 
sectarian, ethnic, nationalistic, doctrinal and socio-political subtleties10. Nevertheless, 
this model illustrates the diversity in Islamic orientations, the process of radicalization 
and the relationship of both to propensity towards violence, a crucial relationship within 
the context of the current investigation. While a unique approach, the following model 
was developed drawing upon the work of David Wright-Neville (2004)11 and William 
Shepard (1987) 12.  
  
The diversity in Islamic orientations, in fact even within one sectarian division (e.g. the 
shi’ite division), are too numerous to even attempt to articulate here when doctrinal, 
cultural, linguistic, ethnic and nationalistic nuances are taken into account. By Islamic 
orientation I mean that complex of belief and practice which exists at both the individual 
and group level and may be differentiated between both the collective and individual. 
This paper is interested in not only recognizing the diversity within Islamic orientations, 
but understanding that diversity within the context of the differing perception of the role 
of selectively literalist interpretations of Islamic doctrine within the socio-cultural realm. 
Building upon this, radicalisation is therefore understood here as a comparative 
increase and broadening in the attitudinal belief of the role of selectively literalist 
interpretation of Islamic doctrine to the public socio-cultural realm by an individual or 
identifiable collective. Consequently, a collective who believes that constructed 
orientation towards Islam is relevant only to the individual and should not be applied to 
the socio-political realm, will be considered comparatively less radical than a collective 
who believes that Islam should be the all-encompassing framework to govern all 
spheres of life. Used in this way, “radicalisation” in this context is absent of moral and 
ethical judgment and merely refers to a comparative assessment of attitudinal belief.  
 
It is necessary to now define four ideal categorizations of adherents to Islam that, while 
not necessarily reflecting every potential case study, nevertheless aid in the process of 
identification, analysis and comparison of a diversity of manifestations. These 
categorizations are purposely general and do not indulge in specific ideological 
nuances. The four categorizations13 are as follows: 
 
Secularist: Secularists believe that there should be a separation between the realm of 
religion and politics. In other words, Islam should not act as a framework for shaping 
the political sphere. For secularists the role of Islam should remain purely personal. 
Modernist: According to Shepard’s definition, “…Islamic modernism insists that Islam 
does provide an adequate ideological base for public life” (1987: 311). I wish to assert 
that modernists are defined not only by their belief that Islam does provide an adequate 
basis for life, but that it is also compatible with secular ideological perspectives. For 
example, modernists will characteristically claim that Islamic principles are compatible 
with secular philosophies of democracy and capitalism.  
Radical: Radicals believe that selectively literalist interpretations of Islamic doctrine 
should play a crucial role in both the personal and collective spheres as an all-
encompassing framework for life. For radicals, Islam as a framework for life is 
incompatible with any secular ideology. However, they do not seek to impose this by 
personally engaging in violence.  
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Militant: Militants see it as necessary to engage in violence to ensure that their 
selectively literalist interpretation of Islamic doctrine is institutionalized without 
contamination from secular perspectives. Militants engage in terrorist violence14. 
 
These categorizations have been applied to the spectrum below. The further right one 
moves along the spectrum represents an increasing perception of the need to apply 
selectively literalist interpretations of Islam to the socio-cultural realm. Hence, the 
further along the spectrum one moves, the more comparatively radical the individual or 
collective becomes. Due to the generalized nature of the categorizations and the 
position of these categorizations on a spectrum, the transitory nature of the 
radicalization process is most effectively illustrated. One does not simply flick a switch 
in the mind of an individual and he/she becomes more or less radicalized, it is a 
process. Hence, an individual may move along the spectrum from a modernist 
perspective towards a radical perspective as their perception of the growing need to 
apply Islam to the socio-cultural spheres increases. This process of radicalization is 
inevitably coupled with a growing perception of crisis related to the perceived 
divergence between their perception of the role of Islam in the socio-cultural realm and 
the manifestation of that in reality. Nevertheless, due to the growing perception of crisis 
that inevitably leads to radicalization of the individual or collective in question, a 
growing propensity towards violence also occurs. Hence, this model implies that a 
secularist, modernist or radical may be a political actor, but it is the militant who will 
engage in terrorist violence. The charismatic leader inevitably plays a pivotal role in this 
perception. 
 
Ultimately, this model seconds as a framework within which to understand not just the 
radicalization of religious adherents, but the emergence of religious terrorism. As 
adherents pass through the spectrum, and the process of radicalization becomes more 
extreme as the associated perception of crisis becomes more severe, so to does one’s 
propensity towards violence increase. As Sprinzak argues,  
 
What terrorists do- and other radicals do not- is to bring their rejection of the 
regime’s legitimacy to the point of challenging it with unconventional violence. 
However, since terrorism never emerges overnight, this crisis of legitimacy 
unfolds through a prolonged process of delegitimation of the established 
society and the regime. (Sprinzak 1991: 51-52) 
 
This is, in essence, the process which the above model illustrates: the process by 
which religious terrorism emerges. Juergensmeyer suggests that, “…the perception 
that the problem with politics is, at some level, religious…. Means ‘religionizing’ 
politics… in two ways: by showing that political difficulties have a religious cause, and 
that religious goals have a political solution” (Juergensmeyer (1991). The charismatic 
leader plays a catalytic role in the radicalization process by highlighting, accentuating 
or even creating the perception of crisis within an individual or group. James Piscatori 
argues that the disparity between reality and the Islamic ideal, “…tends to become 
greater and the disappointment more acute in times of rapid change” (Piscatoro 1986: 
21). It is during periods of socio-economic, political and cultural breakdown in Islamic 
societies that  Islamist charismatic leaders rose to prominence15. 
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Diagram 1: Model of Diversity in Islamic Orientation 
 
  
The Islamic Tradition: Fostering Charismatic Leadership & the notion of 
transformative charisma 
 
 
Charismatic leaders of Islamist radical and terrorist groups selectively use the traditions, 
teachings and values of Islam both to legitimize their actions and the actions of their 
followers, as well as to shape the cognitive perceptions of their followers regarding both 
themselves and the world around them. Muslims, like adherents to any religious 
tradition or even secular citizens, raise ideological questions in times of rapid and 
intense socio-cultural change in an attempt to understand the world around them. 
Inevitably, charismatic leaders tend to arise in Islamic societies in such situations. 
Because Islam does not have a single, hierarchically based clerical leadership, as for 
instance in the Catholic church, it tends to have more space for the emergence of 
charismatic individuals in such times 16 . In Islam there exists certain ideological 
concepts, such as ijtihad (independent interpretation of Islamic doctrine), jihad (struggle) 
and tajdid (renewal), which ideologically gears the religion for a continual process of 
renewal and reform in the face of change and adversity17. The picture that emerges is 
of a religion that not only fosters charismatic leadership, but makes fertile the socio-
cultural environment for the rise of charismatic individuals. Throughout the entire 
chronological development of the modern Islamist movement a chain of charismatic 
leaders stretching from Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1838-97), arguably the father of the 
modern Islamist movement, to Osama bin Laden and beyond is indicative of the 
presence of the TCP in Islamic radicalism and militancy18.  
  
While the emergence of individual charismatic leaders throughout the modern Islamist 
movement can be explained by identifying the existence of the factors and 
characteristics identified in the theoretical framework of charismatic leadership 
established earlier, this explanation is not entirely sufficient. While such an approach is 
helpful in explaining the emergence of individual charismatic leaders, it is not enough to 
explain how an identifiable chain of charismatic Islamist leaders has emerged. The 
TCP in Islamic radicalism and militancy is a type of routinisation and refers to the 
notion that a series of charismatic leaders have emerged throughout the chronological 
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development of the modern Islamist movement by building upon the charisma, ideology 
and leadership qualities of preceding Islamist leaders. Tracing this phenomenon 
towards the emergence of Islamist militancy (Islamic terrorism) will be the focus of the 
remainder of this paper. While space considerations will not allow an in-depth analysis 
of this complex phenomenon, by focusing on the socio-historical phases of the TCP in 
Islamic radicalism and militancy I will identify the charismatic leaders who emerged in 
these phases and highlight the tangible links that connect each leader to their 
predecessor. 
 
 
Transformative charisma: Tracing the roots of Islamist terrorism 
 
 
Islamic history, from its beginnings to the late-1700s, was a story of great successes. 
For a variety of reasons, the Islamic empires were in rapid decline by the late-1700s 
and this decline coincided with, and was partly the result of, the ascendancy of 
European powers. Inevitably, the decline of the Islamic empires instigated rigorous 
intramural questioning which eventually gave birth to the contemporary Islamist 
movement. As Wilfred Smith argues:  
 
The fundamental malaise of modern Islam is a sense that something has 
gone wrong with Islamic history. The fundamental problem of modern 
Muslims is how to rehabilitate that history, to get it going again in full vigor, 
so that Islamic society may once again flourish as a divinely guided 
society should and must. The fundamental spiritual crisis of Islam in the 
twentieth century stems from an awareness that something is awry 
between the religion which God has appointed and the historical 
development of the world which He controls. (Smith 1961: 47-48) 
 
The roots of the TCP in Islamic radicalism and militancy, like the roots of the modern 
Islamist movement itself, begin with the emergence of a charismatic individual: Jamal 
al-Din al-Afghani (1838-1897). The emergence of Afghani and proceeding charismatic 
leaders cannot be understood outside of the socio-historical conditions of the time. It is 
in reaction to these socio-historical conditions that the charismatic leader emerges and 
constructs his image. Ideology plays a pivotal role in the construction of this image and 
their ideological nuances are inevitably in response to the socio-historical reality of the 
time. So, while such charismatic leaders build upon the charismatic capital of their 
predecessors, the charismatic leader-follower relationship will emerge only if they can 
develop their own ideological nuances and charismatic image in response to socio-
historical conditions unique to their time. Consequently, the most effective way to map 
the dynamics of the TCP in Islamic radicalism and militancy is within the context of 
distinct historical phases. 
 
 
The Colonialism Period (late-1800s to 1945): Egypt 
 
 
The decline of the Islamic empires and the ascendancy of Europe was the backdrop for 
the birth of the modern Islamist movement. The general consensus within the field is 
that Afghani was the founder of the modern Islamist movement. It is Afghani who re-
opened the doors of ijtihad in the late-1800s and played a pivotal role in the emergence 
of Islamic modernism by instigating and encouraging political activism.  Afghani's 
influence throughout the Middle East, but particularly Egypt, was immense and while 
he mentored many prominent individuals, including the Egyptian Nationalist Sa'ad 
Zaghlul (1857-1927), it was Muhammad Abduh (1849-1905) and Rashid Rida (1865-
1935) who continued the work of their mentor after his death in 1897. The first two 
phases of the TCP in Islamic radicalism and militancy focuses exclusively on Egypt. In 
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fact, Egypt is arguably the most important nation in the early evolution of the modern 
Islamist movement. 
 
Afghani, Abduh and Rida were Islamic modernists who believed that to revive the 
Islamic world it was important to draw upon and learn from Europe while staying true to 
their Islamic values. However, the inability of Islamic modernists to find a universally 
accepted middle-ground between traditional Islamic values and the advancements of 
the West, coupled with the socio-historical environment of the time, caused a 
significant shift away from a perceived need to emulate and draw upon the West. By 
the 1920s, Rida had evolved away from his predecessors and was espousing an 
ideology that called for the rejection of the West and a return to Islam as an all-
encompassing framework for human existence19. This ideological shift is significant 
because it represents the earliest move towards the more radical reformist movements.  
One of Rida’s disciples would go onto be the founder of modern Islamic radicalism, 
taking Rida’s ideology and developing it further. This individual was Hassan al-Banna20 
(1906-1949), founder of the Muslim Brotherhood21.  
 
When tracing the TCP in Islamic radicalism and militancy, Al-Banna emerges as a 
critical individual to the chain. Al-Banna's ideology reflects a number of significant 
developments when compared to his modernist predecessors. Firstly, al-Banna argued 
that Islam must be made the central guiding force for all aspects of human life. 
Secondly, jihad plays a central role in al-Banna's ideology. These two developments, 
which represent a radicalization in Islamist ideology, reflect an increasing perception of 
crisis within Egyptian society regarding the failures of indigenous authority to achieve 
independence from their British colonialists. The influence of the British occupiers not 
only stunted Egypt's development politically and economically, but many believed that 
their presence was destroying Egypt culturally and morally. The ideology of al-Banna 
reflected these sentiments22.  
 
Organizationally the Muslim Brotherhood would become the prototype for many 
proceeding Islamic reformist and terrorist organizations. Most importantly to this 
investigation is the emergence of the charismatic leader as the "figure head" or image 
of the organization. Furthermore, a number of important individuals would emerge from 
the Muslim Brotherhood, arguably the most influential being Sayyid Qutb (1906-
1966)23.  
 
 
The post-Colonialism or Nationalist Period (1945-1966): Egypt 
 
 
This phase of the TCP in Islamic radicalism and militancy is pivotal to the emergence of 
the Islamic terrorism phenomenon. After centuries of European colonialism and 
decades of anti-colonialist struggle, the Nasser regime, led by Gamar Abdel Nasser 
(1918-1970) emerged as the first truly indigenous government of Egypt in 1952. The 
period immediately after World War II is characterized by a wave of nationalist, anti-
colonialist independence movements emerging throughout the Middle East, Africa and 
Asia. In Egypt, after decades of struggle for independence and freedom from the 
influence of Europe, the Nasser regime came to power with the assistance of the 
Muslim Brotherhood. However, the Muslim Brotherhood soon were viewed as a threat 
by Nasser and they were banned and brutally repressed. Many of the Brotherhood's 
members were forced into exile, imprisoned and tortured or killed. The ideological 
radicalization which materialized from the perceived betrayal and then oppression of 
the Brotherhood is encapsulated in the ideology of Qutb24.  
 
The central argument of Qutb’s ideology is that all modern societies are jahiliyya (the 
period of ignorance in pre-Islam Arabia) and implied that the members of that society, 
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according to the literal interpretation of Islamic law, are kafir or infidel (one who rejects 
Islam). This accusation is known as takfir, or the proclamation of a fellow believer as an 
infidel, and its implications are sometimes deadly (Hiro 1989: 68; Kepel 2003: 31). 
Qutb’s application of the term jahiliyya, and its implication, takfir, when interpreted to 
the extreme, was effectively a death sentence upon the people of those societies. Put 
simply, Qutb’s ideology justified the use of violence against jahili societies. For Qutb, 
jihad was a constant fixture in society and was not for purely defensive purposes. 
Again, there is a direct relationship between the radicalization of Islamist ideology and 
perception of crisis. As with those who preceded him, Qutb's ideology reflects the 
period from which it emerged. Interestingly, Qutb's charismatic appeal emerged 
posthumously. While Qutb's ideology emerged from the circumstances which 
characteristic the "Post-Colonialist Period", his charismatic appeal exploded in the 
"Modern Period" of the TCP in Islamic radicalism and militancy. 
 
 
The Modern Period (late-1960s to present) 
 
 
Qutb's execution in 1966 passed with little acknowledgement from the rest of the world. 
For almost two decades political Islam was practically abandoned in the name of pan-
Arabism led by Nasser. However, the shock of defeat in the 1967 Six Day War, and the 
inevitable questioning which emerges in times of crisis, instigated a revival of Islam. In 
countries throughout the Middle East, Africa and Asia the broken promises of 
indigenous nationalist movements, all of whom inevitably emerged as bastardized 
socialist or democratic governments, left a feeling of bitterness and resentment towards 
not only their own governments but the two Cold War superpowers. The "Modern 
Period" is consequently characterized by a resurgence of Islam. As part of this Islamic 
resurgence, the more radical and militant Islamic groups have risen to particular 
prominence. Again, the heightened perception of crisis emerges due to the perceived 
need to return to Islam as a solution in the aftermath of the failings of "secular 
governments".  
 
It is in this environment and from the ideological influences of Sayyid Qutb that three 
types of charismatic leadership in Islamic terrorism emerge: charismatic leaders, neo-
charismatic leaders and spiritual guides. While space considerations will not allow an 
in-depth analysis of the spiritual guide type, suffice to say that their emergence is a 
manifestation of the TCP in Islamic radicalism and militancy. Spiritual guides are 
characterized by their ability to subtly and, to the perception of outsiders, indirectly 
encourage their supporters to engage in acts of terrorism. This is typically achieved 
through their ideological rhetoric. However, it is the charismatic and neo-charismatic 
leader types which will be the focus of the remainder of this paper.  
 
The emergence of the charismatic leader type is a unique evolutionary step in the TCP 
in Islamic radicalism and militancy. While the charismatic leaders of the "Colonialist" 
and "Post-Colonialist/Nationalist" periods were first and foremost ideologues, the 
charismatic leader type not only encourages but facilitates terrorist violence. This type 
of charismatic leadership in Islamic terrorism is epitomized by Osama bin Laden25 and 
his emergence can be understood within the context of the TCP in Islamic radicalism 
and militancy. Specifically, one of bin Laden's ideological mentors at King Abdul Aziz 
University was Muhammad Qutb, the brother of Sayyid Qutb26. Yet the ideology which 
bin Laden espouses is a significant evolutionary step from his predecessors. Bin 
Laden's rhetoric calls for an international jihad where there is no differentiation between 
civilians and military combatants. Furthermore, bin Laden not only encourages but 
facilitates the use of terrorist violence. Once again, the increasing ideological 
radicalization reflected in bin Laden's rhetoric mirrors a heightened and more 
intensified perception of crisis in his communities of potential support. However the 
TCP in Islamic radicalism and militancy can be traced further to a man who was 
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seemingly destined to depose bin Laden as the "face of Islamic terrorism" until his 
death in June 2006: Abu Musab al-Zarqawi.   
 
While the emergence of the charismatic leader phenomenon in Islamist terrorism 
reflected an evolutionary step from the charismatic leaders of the "Colonial" and "Post-
Colonial/Nationalist" periods, the neo-charismatic leader represents a further 
evolutionary development in the TCP. The neo-charismatic leader type is a 
comparatively younger individual when compared with his predecessors and 
characteristically directly engages in violence. Zarqawi epitomized this new breed of 
charismatic leader: young, brash, militant in inclination and brutal. If the charismatic 
leader type is characterized by their call to "do as I say", the neo-charismatic leader 
type is encapsulated in the phrase of "do as I do." Zarqawi is arguably the most widely 
recognised neo-charismatic leader of an Islamist terrorist group and is believed to have 
been responsible for a number of beheadings in the Iraq conflict, not to mention 
hundreds of deadly bombings throughout the country. The neo-charismatic leader, 
while having his roots in the "Modern Period", is very much emerging as a key feature 
of the "Globalising World Phase" of the TCP in Islamic radicalism and militancy. Like 
the charismatic leaders who preceded them, this new generation of charismatic leaders 
of Islamist terrorist groups are destined to be used as the charismatic capital for 
proceeding manifestations of the TCP in Islamic radicalism and militancy27.  
 
 
Conclusion  
 
 
While space considerations limited the scope of this paper, its primary purpose was to 
exhibit the potential for the study of charismatic leadership to be used as a paradigm in 
which to understand the emergence of Islamic radicalism and militancy. The central 
focus of this paper was examining the TCP in Islamic radicalism and militancy with the 
intention of identifying the chain of charismatic leaders stretching across the entire 
chronology of the modern Islamist movement which forms the roots of the Islamic 
terrorism phenomenon. From the beginning of the modern Islamist movement to the 
present, this paper traced the TCP in Islamic radicalism and militancy from the 
"Colonialism Period", through the "post-Colonial/Nationalist" period and into the 
"Modern Period". It is evident from mapping the TCP in Islamic radicalism and militancy 
that the process of radicalisation is intimately linked with perception of crisis and it is 
within this context that the charismatic leader emerges. That fact that an identifiable 
chain of charismatic leaders stretching across the entire chronology of the modern 
Islamist movement, reflecting an increasing radicalisation and propensity towards 
violence with each proceeding leader, suggests that the perception of crisis is not only 
more prevalent but intensifying. The picture which emerges from this study is of a 
phenomenon which will continue to evolve if the perceptions of crisis within 
communities of potential support are not addressed and alleviated. 
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1 The study of charismatic leadership theory is a complex, multi-disciplinary field and space 
considerations will not allow an in-depth analysis of the field (See Yukl1 1999; House11999; 
Bass 1988; Conger 1988 for discussion of various debates). 
2 Due to space considerations, it will not be possible to fully analyse and critique Weber’s theory 
of charismatic leadership (For such an analysis see Jay Conger (1988), Robert House (1999), 
Robert Dowse and John Hughes (1982), S.N. Eisenstadt (1995a) and Anne R. Willner (1984)).  
3 See Shamir, B. (1991) “Charismatic relationship: alternative explanations and predictions”. 
Leadership Quarterly. (Electronic), 2(2) for overview of field of charismatic leadership theory. 
4 For details of this approach refer to E.A. Shils (1965) and S. N. Eisenstadt (1995). 
5 See Shamir, B. (1991) “Charismatic relationship: alternative explanations and predictions”. 
Leadership Quarterly. (Electronic), 2(2): 91. 
6 See Freud or Robins and Post for examples of this approach. 
7See Willner (1984), Bryman (1992) and Bradley and Roberts (1988) for examples of this 
approach. 
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8 The notion of a "moral panic" is a perception that certain moral values are being either 
undermined or attacked in a society.  
9 Amtcharisma (“charisma of office”), Geltilcharisma (charisma of kinship) and Erbcharisma 
(hereditary charisma). 
10 Instead see Esposito, John (1998) Islam: The Straight Path 3rd edition. (New York: Oxford 
University Press), Shepard, W. (2004) “The Diversity of Islamic Thought in the 20th century: 
Towards a Typology”.  
11 Wright-Neville’s nuanced investigation into the nature of Islamist politics in Southeast Asia 
focused upon understanding, “…the attitudinal dynamics that are leading Southeast Asian and 
other Muslims… to see as a legitimate form of politics individual acts of violence by non-state 
actors that contravene conventionally accepted notion of just war” (2004: 30). Building upon 
Sprinzak’s theory of delegitmization, Wright-Neville categorises a number of Islamist 
organizations into three categories, “activist”, “militant” and “terrorist”, using both rhetoric and 
action as a measure, he categorises the groups, “…according to the degree of alienation they 
evince from the prevailing status quo” (Wright-Neville 2004: 31). The purpose of Wright-Neville’s 
model was to categorise those religious adherents already participating in the political sphere as 
either activists, militants or terrorists (Wright-Neville 2004: 32) and a survey of those who do not 
participate in the political sphere was out of the scope of his model. 
12 While Shepard (1987) created a typology of “ideological orientations” which looked at the 
relationship between the, “…doctrinal content of the ideologies and teachings…” (1987: 308) of 
“secularist”, “Islamic modernist”, “radical Islamist”, “traditionalist” and “neo-traditionalist” main 
types and modernity, his approach did not explicitly look at the relationship between these types 
and propensity towards violence. Furthermore, his approach did not explicitly delve into the 
process of radicalization which could potentially transform a modernist into a radical and vice 
versa. 
13 The categorizations are formulated using generalized attitudinal beliefs regarding the role of 
selectively literalist interpretations of Islam to the public sphere as the defining criteria. 
14 Terrorist violence refers to the threat or use of violence with the intention of coercing change 
in the political/socio-cultural realm. 
15 It will be argued that these characteristics have come to define modern Islamic history, hence 
motivating the birth of the contemporary Islamist movement. 
16 One of the implications of this is that in times of perceived crisis, due to the absence of a 
single, hierarchical leadership elite, followers turn to those individuals from either the umma  or 
ulema. Without a “traditional” or “leagal-rational” establishment, it is almost inevitable that 
charismatic individuals will emerge.    
17 In fact, many scholars suggest that the stagnation of the Islamic empires in the centuries prior 
to the 20th century occurred as a result of the closing of the doors of ijtuhad, hence the decline 
of the Islamic civilizations in the face of Western colonialism and imperialism.  
18  The chain is as follows: Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, Muhammad Abduh and Rashid Rida, 
Hassan al-Banna, Sayyid Qutb, Mohammad Qutb and Abdullah Azzam, Osama bin Laden, al-
Zarqawi. This chain of charismatic leaders, each with tangible links connecting one to the other, 
stretches from the beginning of the modern Islamist movement in the late 1800s into the 21st 
century and beyond. This chain is focussed specifically on the sunni  chain of the TCP in Islamic 
radicalism and militancy. 
19 We see in Rida the rationalized process of radicalization as illustrated in the model earlier. 
Rida’s shift is one from “modernist” to “radical”. 
20  For more on al-Banna see Hawwa (1985),  Ushama (1995) and Esposito (2002). 
21 In al-Banna we see the beginnings of the radicalization process from radical to militant. 
Although it is questionable that he made the transition to completion, he nevertheless created 
an organization that facilitated this transition in others. 
22 At the height of its popularity, the Muslim Brotherhood enjoyed  
23 Again, Qutb is a curious study in that he went from being a rather “secular-modernist” to a 
“radical-militant” in the course of his life. This radicalization is best illustrated in the earlier 
model. 
24 For more on Qutb see Zeidan (2002), Qutb (2002) and Kepel (2003). 
25 For more on bin Laden see Corbin (2003), Benjamin and Simon (2003) and  
Bergen (2001). 
26 The chain from Afghani to bin Laden and Zarqawi read as follows: Afghani, Abduh, Rida, al-
Banna, Sayyid Qutb, Muhammad Qutb, bin Laden and Zarqawi. 
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27. The TCP in Islamic radicalism and militancy has recently generated a unique manifestation 
of Islamic terrorism which has already proven to be both deadly and hard to counter. While the 
charismatic leader acted as the vehicle for change in the earlier phases of the TCP in Islamic 
radicalism and militancy, the July 2005 London Bombers heralded a new era in the 
phenomenon. The emergence of terrorist cells with no tangible links with a wider organisation or 
charismatic leader signals the materialization of the "self-generating mini-group" phenomenon. 
 
 
